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Abstract—A bandwidth puzzle was recently proposed to de-
fend against colluding adversaries in peer-to-peer networks. The
colluding adversaries do not do actual work but claim to have
uploaded contents for each other to gain free credits from the
system. The bandwidth puzzle guarantees that if the adversaries
can solve the puzzle, they must have spent substantial bandwidth,
the size of which is comparable to the size of the contents they
claim to have uploaded for each other. Therefore, the puzzle
discourages the collusion. In this paper, we study the performance
of the bandwidth puzzle and give a lower bound on the average
number of bits the adversaries must receive to be able to solve
the puzzles with a certain probability. We show that our bound
is tight in the sense that there exists a strategy to approach this
lower bound asymptotically within a small factor. The new bound
gives better security guarantees than the existing bound, and can
be used to guide better choices of puzzle parameters to improve
the system performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
A key problem in peer-to-peer (p2p) based content sharing
is the incentive for peers to contribute bandwidth to serve other
peers [16].Without a robust incentive mechanism, peers may
choose not to upload contents for other peers, causing the entire
system to fail. In many applications, a peer’s contribution is
measured by the number of bits it uploaded for other peers.
It is difficult to measure the contribution because peers may
collude with each other to get free credits. For example, if
Alice and Bob are friends, Alice, without actually uploading,
may claim that she has uploaded a certain amount of bits for
Bob. Bob, when asked about this claim, will attest that it is
true because he is Alice’s friend. Therefore, Alice gets free
credits.
With the current Internet infrastructure, such collusions are
difficult to detect, because the routers do not keep records
of the traffic. Recently, a bandwidth puzzle scheme has been
proposed solve this problem [14]. In the bandwidth puzzle
scheme, a central credit manager, called the verifier, is assumed
to exist in the network. The verifier issues puzzles to suspected
nodes, called provers, to verify whether the claimed transac-
tions are true. To be more specific, when the verifier suspects
a set of provers for certain transactions, it issues puzzles
simultaneously to all the involved provers, and asks them to
send back answers within a time threshold. The puzzle’s main
features are (1) it takes time to solve a puzzle and (2) a puzzle
can be solved only if the prover has access to the contents. To
illustrate the basic idea of the puzzle, consider the previous
simple example with Alice and Bob. The verifier issues two
puzzles, one to Alice and one to Bob. As Alice did not upload
the content for Bob, Alice has the content but Bob does not.
When received the puzzles, Alice can solve hers and send the
answer to the verifier before the threshold but not Bob. Bob
also cannot ask help from Alice, because Alice cannot solve
two puzzles within the threshold. Given this, Bob will fail to
reply with the answer of the puzzle and the verifier will know
that the transaction did not take place.
The bandwidth puzzle is most suited for live video broadcast
applications, where fresh contents are generated constantly
[14]. The verifier can naturally reside in the source node of the
video, and the puzzle is based on the unique content currently
being broadcast, such that there can be no existing contents
downloaded earlier to solve the puzzles. The construction of
bandwidth puzzle is simple and based only on hash functions
and pseudorandom functions. In [14], the puzzle scheme was
implemented and incorporated into a p2p video distributing
system, and was shown to be able to limit collusions signifi-
cantly. An upper bound was also given for the expected number
of puzzles that can be solved given the limit of the number of
bits received among the adversaries. However, the bound is
“loose in several respects,” as stated by the authors, because
its dominating term is quadratic to the number of adversaries
such that it deteriorates quickly as the number of adversaries
increases. In this paper, we give a much improved bound on the
performance of the puzzle. The new bound gives the average
number of bits the adversaries must have received if they can
solve the puzzles with a certain probability. As we will prove,
the average number of bits the adversaries receive is linear to
the number of adversaries for all values of adversaries. It is also
asymptotically tight, in the sense that there exists a strategy
that achieves this bound asymptotically within a small factor.
The improved bound leads to more relaxed constraints on the
choice of puzzle parameters, which should in turn improve the
system performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the construction of the puzzle. Section III gives the
proof of the new bound. Section IV discusses the practical
puzzle parameters and shows how a simple strategy approaches
the bound. Section V discusses related works. Section VI
concludes the paper.
n The number of bits in the content
k The number of indices in an index set
L The number of index sets in a puzzle
z The number of puzzles sent to a prover
θ The time threshold to solve the puzzles
TABLE I
LIST OF PUZZLE PARAMETERS
II. THE CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we describe the construction of the puzzle.
The puzzle construction is largely the same as [14] except
one difference: allowing repeated indices in one index set (the
definition of index set will be given shortly), which simplifies
the puzzle construction. We first give a high-level overview of
the puzzle construction as well as introducing some notations.
The main parameters of the puzzle are listed in Table I.
A. A High-level Description
The content being challenged is referred to simply as con-
tent. There are n bits in the content, each given a unique index.
An index set is defined as k ordered indices chosen from the n
indices. Each index set defines a string denoted as str , called
the true string of this index set, which is obtained by reading
the bits in the content according to the indices. str can be
hashed using a hash function denoted as hash, and the output
is referred to as the hash of the index set. To construct a puzzle,
the verifier needs L index sets denoted as I1, . . . , IL, where
an index set is obtained by randomly choosing the indices,
allowing repeat. The verifier randomly chooses one index set
among the L index sets, denoted as Iℓˆ, called the answer index
set. It uses hash to get the hash of Iℓˆ, denoted as hˆ, which
is called the hint of the puzzle. The puzzle is basically the L
index sets and hˆ. When challenged with a puzzle, the prover
should prove that it knows which index set hashes into hˆ, by
presenting another hash of Iℓˆ generated by hash function ans.
The purpose of using ans is to reduce the communication cost,
as str ℓˆ may be long. The verifier may issue z puzzles to the
prover and the prover has to solve the all puzzles before a time
threshold θ.
From a high level, the strengths of the puzzle are (1) a prover
has to know the content, otherwise it cannot get the true strings
of the index sets (2) even if the prover knows the content, it
still needs to spend time to try different index sets until it
finds an index set with the same hash as the hint, refereed to
as a confirm event, because the hash function is one-way. In
practice, the verifier need not generate all index sets; it need
only generate and find the hash of the answer index set. The
verifier should not send the L index sets to the prover because
this requires a large communication cost; instead, the verifier
and the prover can agree on the same pseudorandom functions
to generate the index sets and the verifier sends only a key for
the pseudorandom functions. Therefore, this construction has
low computation cost and low communication cost.
As a example, suppose n = 8 and the content is 00110101.
Suppose k = 4, L = 3, and the three index sets in the puzzle
are I1 = {5, 3, 7, 0}, I2 = {1, 2, 6, 3}, and I3 = {2, 3, 5, 3}.
Correspondingly, str1 = 1110, str2 = 0101 and str3 = 1111.
Suppose the verifier chooses ℓˆ = 1. Suppose hash is the simply
the the parity bit of the string, such that hˆ = 1. The prover
qhash The number of hash queries allowed, determined by θ
Ω A special oracle for hash and content queries
V The maximum number of missed bits
δ A positive number determined by puzzle parameters
TABLE 2
LIST OF NOTATIONS IN THE PROOF
receives the the hint and generates the three index sets, and
finds that only I1 has parity bit 1. Suppose ans is simply the
parity bit of every pair of adjacent bits. The prover presents
‘01’ which proves that it knows I1 is the answer index set.
B. Detailed Puzzle Construction
In the construction, it is assumed that the keys of the
pseudorandom functions and the output of the hash functions
are both κ bits. In practice, κ = 160 suffices.
Pseudorandom functions are used to generate the index sets.
A pseudorandom function family {fK} is a family of functions
parameterized by a secret key. Roughly speaking, once ini-
tialized by a key, a pseudorandom function generates outputs
that are indistinguishable from true random outputs. Two
pseudorandom function families are used: {f1K : {1, . . . , L} →
{0, 1}κ} and {f2K : {1, . . . , k} → {1, . . . , n}}.
Two hash functions are used in the construction, hash and
ans. hash is used to get the hint. It actually hashes the concate-
nation of a κ-bit key, a number in the range of [1, L], and a k-
bit string into κ-bits: {0, 1}κ×{1, . . . , L}×{0, 1}k → {0, 1}κ.
To prove the security of the puzzle, hash is modeled as a
random oracle [6]. The other hash function is ans : {0, 1}k →
{0, 1}κ. For ans, only collision-resistance is assumed.
As mentioned earlier, a puzzle consists of the hint hˆ and
L index-sets. The verifier first randomly picks a κ-bit string
as key K1. Then it randomly picks a number ℓˆ from [1, L] as
the index of the answer index set. With K1 and ℓˆ, it generates
K ℓˆ2 ← f1K1(ℓˆ). K ℓˆ2 is used as the key for f2K2 to generate the
indices in the answer index set: Iℓˆ = {f2K ℓˆ
2
(1) . . . f2
K ℓˆ
2
(k)}.
The verifier then finds str ℓˆ. It then uses the concatenation of
K1, ℓˆ, and str ℓˆ as the input to hash and uses the output as
hˆ: hˆ← hash(K1, ℓˆ, str ℓˆ). Including K1 and ℓˆ ensures that the
results of one puzzle-solving process cannot be used in the
solving process of another puzzle, regardless of the content, k,
and L. The prover can generate index sets in the same way as
the verifier generates the answer index set, and can compare
the hash of the index sets with the hint until a confirm is found.
When the prover finds a confirm upon string strℓ, it returns
ans(str ℓ).
III. THE SECURITY BOUND
In this section, we derive the new bound for the bandwidth
puzzle. Although the puzzle is designed to defend against
colluding adversaries, we begin with the simple case when
there is only one adversary given only one puzzle, because the
proof for this simple case can be extended to the case when
multiple adversaries are given multiple puzzles.
A. Single Adversary with a Single Puzzle
Consider a single adversary challenged with one puzzle.
We begin with assumptions and definitions. Some key proof
parameters and notations are listed in Table 2.
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1) Assumptions and Definitions: In the proof, we model
hash and ans as random oracles and refer to them as the hash
oracle and the answer oracle, respectively. Obtaining a bit in
the content is also modeled as making a query to the content
oracle denoted as content. The adversary is given access to
hash, ans, and content. To model the computational constraint
of the prover in the limited time θ allowed to solve the puzzle,
we assume the number of queries to hash is no more than qhash.
To ensure that honest provers can solve the puzzle, qhash ≥ L.
However, we do not assume any limitations on the number of
queries to content and ans. We refer a query to content as a
content query and a query to hash a hash query. We use A to
denote the algorithm adopted by the adversary.
In our proof, we define a special oracle, Ω, as an oracle that
answers two kinds of queries, both the content query and the
hash query. Let B be an algorithm for solving the puzzle, when
given access to the special oracle Ω and the answer oracle ans.
If B makes a content query, Ω simply replies with the content
bit. In addition, it keeps the history of the content queries
made. We say a hash query to Ω is informed if there are no
more than V bits missing in the index set and uninformed
otherwise, where V is a proof parameter much smaller than
k. If B makes an informed hash query for Iℓ, Ω replies with
the hash of Iℓ; otherwise, it returns ∅. In addition, if B makes
more than L hash queries for the puzzle, Ω will not answer
further hash queries.
2) Problem Formalization: The questions we seek to an-
swer is: given qhash, if the adversary has a certain advantage
in solving the puzzle, how many content queries it must
make to content on average? In the context of p2p content
distribution, this is analogous to giving a lower bound on the
average number of bits a peer must have downloaded if it
can pass the puzzle challenge with a certain probability. Note
that we emphasize on the average number of bits because a
deterministic bound may be trivial: if the adversary happens to
pick the answer index set in the first attempt of hash queries,
only k content queries are needed. However, the adversary may
be lucky once but unlikely to be always lucky. Therefore, if
challenged with a large number of puzzles, the average number
of queries it makes to content must be above a certain lower
bound, which is the bound we seek to establish.
In an earlier work [14], an upper bound was given on the
expected number puzzles that can be solved if the adversary
is allowed qhash hash queries and a certain number of content
queries. In this work, we remove assumption on the maximum
number of content queries. With less assumptions, our proof
is less restrictive and applies to more general cases. The new
problem is different from the problem studied in [14], and
new techniques are needed to establish the bound. Note that
although the adversaries is allowed to download as many bits
as they wish, they prefer to employ an intelligent algorithm
to minimize the number of downloaded bits because their
intention is to use collusion to avoid spending bandwidth. The
new bound guarantees that, if the adversaries wishes to have a
certain advantage in solving the puzzles, there exists a lower
bound on the average number of bits they have to download,
regardless of the algorithm they adopt.
3) Proof Sketch: A sketch of our proof is as follows. As it
is difficult to derive the optimal algorithm the adversary may
adopt, our proof is “indirect.” That is, by using Ω, we introduce
a simplified environment which is easier to reason about.
We show that an algorithm can be found in the simplified
environment with performance close to that of the best algo-
rithm the adversary may adopt in the real environment. This
provides a link between the simplified environment and the real
environment: knowing the bound for the former, the bound for
the latter is a constant away. We establish the performance
bound of the optimal algorithm in the simplified environment,
by showing that to solve the puzzle with certain probability,
an algorithm must make a certain number of informed hash
queries to Ω and the average number of unique indices in
the informed queries, i.e., the number of content queries, is
bounded.
4) Proof Details: Given any algorithm A the adversaries
may adopt, we construct an algorithm BA that employs A
and implements oracle queries for A. BA terminates when A
terminates, and returns whatA returns. WhenAmakes a query,
BA replies as follows:
Algorithm 1 BA answers oracle queries for A
1: When A makes a query to content, BA makes the same
content query to Ω and returns the result to A.
2: When A makes a query to ans, BA makes the same query
to ans and returns the result to A.
3: When A makes a query to hash for Iℓ:
1) BA checks whether A has made exactly the same
query before. If yes, it returns the same answer as
the last time.
2) BA checks whether there are no less than V bits in
Iℓ that have not been queried. If yes, it returns a
random string.
3) BA checks whether it has made a hash query for Iℓ
before. If no, BA makes a hash query to Ω. If confirm
is obtained upon this query, BA knows that Iℓ is the
answer index set, and sends content queries Ω to get
the remaining bits in Iℓ.
4) If Iℓ is not the answer index set, BA returns a
random string.
5) If the string A submitted is the true string of Iℓ, BA
returns the hash of Iℓ.
6) BA returns a random string.
Let ω() denote the average number of bits received by an
algorithm, where the average is taken over the random choices
of the algorithm and the randomness of the puzzle. We have
Theorem 3.1: Let CA be the event that A returns the correct
answer when A is interacting directly with content, hash and
ans. Let CBA be the event that BA returns the correct answer,
when BA is interacting with Ω and ans. Then,
P [CBA ] ≥ P [CA]−
qhash
2V
,
and
ω[BA] ≤ ω[A] + Lkqhash
2V
+V .
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Proof: In our construction, BA employs A, and answers
oracle queries for A. Denote the random process of A when it
is interacting directly with content, hash and ans as W , and
denote the random process of A when it is interacting with
the oracles implemented by BA as W ′. We prove that W and
W ′ will progress in the same way statistically with only one
exception, while the probability of this exception is bounded.
First, we note that when A makes a query to content or ans,
BA simply gives the query result, therefore the only case needs
to be considered is when A makes a query to hash. When A
makes a query for Iℓ to hash,
• If there are still no less than V unknown bits in this
index set, BA will simply return a random string, which
follows the same distribution as the output of the hash
modeled as a random oracle. If ℓ 6= ℓˆ, such a query will
not result in a confirm, and this will have same effect
on the progress of the algorithm statistically as when A
is making a query to hash. However, if ℓ = ℓˆ, it could
happen that A is making a query with the true string.
In this case, the exception occurs. That is, W ′ will not
terminate, but W will terminate with the correct answer
to the puzzle. However, the probability of this exception
is bounded from the above by qhash2V , because if no less
than V bits are unknown, the probability of making a
hash query with the true string is no more than qhash2V .
• If BA has made enough content queries for this index
set, BA checks whether it has made hash query for this
index set before. If no, BA makes the hash query, and if
a confirm is obtained, BA knows that this is the answer
index set and get the possible remaining bits in it; other-
wise BA knows that it is not the answer index set. If Iℓ is
not the answer index set, BA will simply return a random
string, which will have the same effect statistically on
the progress of A as when A is interacting with hash.
If Iℓ is the answer index set, BA checks whether A is
submitting the true string, and returns the true hash if yes
and a random string otherwise. This, clearly, also has the
same effect statistically of the progress of A as when A
is interacting with hash.
From the above discussion, we can see that P [CBA ] is
no less than P [CA] minus the probability of the exception.
Therefore, the first half of the theorem is proved. We can also
see that if the exception occurs, BA makes at most Lk more
content queries than A. If the exception does not occur, BA
receives at most V bits than A it encapsulates, and therefore
at most V bits more than A on average when A is interacting
directly with content, hash and ans.
Theorem 3.1 allows us to establish a connection between
the “real” puzzle solver and the puzzle solver interacting with
Ω. The advantage of introducing Ω is that a good algorithm
will not send any uninformed queries to Ω, because it will get
no information from such queries. If there is a bound on the
number of hash queries, which are all informed, it is possible
to establish a lower bound on the number of unique indices
involved in such queries, with which the lower bound of the
puzzle can be established. It is difficult to establish such bound
based on hash directly because hash answers any queries.
Although some queries are “more informed” than others, all
queries have non-zero probabilities to get a confirm. The next
theorem establishes the lower bound on the expected number
of informed hash queries to achieve a given advantage by an
optimal algorithm interacting with Ω.
Theorem 3.2: Suppose B is an optimal algorithm for solving
the puzzle when interacting with Ω. If B solves the puzzle with
probability no less than ǫ, on average, the number of informed
hash queries it makes is no less than (ǫ−
1
2V
)(L+1)
2 .
Proof: Let correct denote the event that B returns the
correct answer. Note that
P [correct] = P [correct | confirm]P [confirm]
+P [correct | ¬confirm]P [¬confirm]
= P [confirm]
+P [correct | ¬confirm]P [¬confirm]
≤ P [confirm] + P [correct | ¬confirm]
≤ P [confirm] + 1
2V
Note that P [correct | ¬confirm] ≤ 12V because if the algorithm
returns the correct answer, it must have the true string of the
answer index set, since ans is collision-resistant. If a confirm
was not obtained, the answer index set is missing no less than
V bits, since otherwise an optimal algorithm should make
query which will result in a confirm. Therefore, the probability
that the algorithm can obtain the true string of the answer index
set is no more than 12V . Note that hash queries to Ω will not
help in the guessing of the true string, because Ω is aware
of the number of missing bits and will not reply with any
information. Therefore, any algorithm that achieves advantage
ǫ in solving the puzzle must have an advantage of no less than
ǫ− 12V to get confirm.
Let P1 be the probability that B makes no hash query and
let Pi be the probability that B stops making hash queries
after all previous queries (queries 1 to i−1) failed to generate
a confirm for 2 ≤ i ≤ L. Consider the probability that a
confirm is obtained upon the ith query. For a given set of
P1, P2, . . . , PL, because ℓˆ is picked at random, the probability
is
(1− P1)L− 1
L
(1 − P2)L− 2
L− 1 . . . (1 − Pi)
1
L− i
=
1
L
i∏
j=1
(1− Pj)
Therefore, the probability that the algorithm can get a confirm
is
L∑
i=1
[
1
L
i∏
j=1
(1− Pj)].
The event that exactly i queries are made occurs when a
confirm was obtained upon the ith query, or when all first i
queries failed to obtain the confirm and the algorithm decides
to stop making queries. The probability is thus
[
i∏
j=1
(1− Pj)][ 1
L
+
L− i
L
Pi+1].
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Note that PL+1 is not previously defined. However, as L−iL = 0
when i = L, for convenience, we can use the same expression
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ L for any arbitrary value of PL+1. To derive
the lower bound, we therefore need to solve the problem of
minimizing
L∑
i=1
i[
i∏
j=1
(1− Pj)][ 1
L
+
L− i
L
Pi+1]
subject to constraint that
L∑
i=1
[
1
L
i∏
j=1
(1 − Pj)] = ǫ− 1
2V
and
0 ≤ Pi ≤ 1.
To solve the problem, we let ηi =
∏i
j=1(1 − Pj) and note
that Pi+1 = 1− ηi+1ηi . Therefore,
L∑
i=1
i[
i∏
j=1
(1 − Pj)][ 1
L
+
L− i
L
Pi+1]
=
L∑
i=1
iηi[
1
L
+
L− i
L
(1− ηi+1
ηi
)]
=
1
L
[
L∑
i=1
(L − i+ 1)ηii−
L−1∑
i=1
(L− i)ηi+1i]
=
1
L
[
L∑
i=1
(L − i+ 1)ηi].
We therefore consider a new problem as minimizing
1
L [
∑L
i=1(L − i + 1)ηi] subject to constraint that
∑L
i=1 ηi =
L(ǫ − 12V ), 0 ≤ ηi ≤ 1, ηi+1 ≤ ηi. The optimal value for
the newly defined problem must be no more than that of the
original problem, because any valid assignment of {Pi}i gives
a valid assignment of {ηi}i. To achieve the optimal value of
the new problem, note that if i < j, the coefficient of ηi is
more than ηj in the objective function, therefore, to minimize
the objective function, we should reduce ηi and increase
ηj . Considering that {ηi}i is nondecreasing, the optimal is
achieved when all ηi are set to the same value (ǫ − 12V ), and
the optimal value is (ǫ−
1
2V
)(L+1)
2 .
Based on Theorem 3.2, any algorithm with an advantage
of ǫ must make no less than certain number of informed
hash queries to Ω on average. We next derive the number of
unique indices in a given number index sets. We first need the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.3: Suppose c indices are randomly picked among
n indices, with repeat. Let Y be the random number denoting
the number of unique indices among c indices. Let µ = n(1−
δ)[1−(1− 1n )c] for a constant 0 < δ < 1 and η =
c−n ln nn−µ
n
√
( 1n−µ− 1n )
.
We have
P [Y ≤ µ] ≤ e
−η2/2
√
2πη
when n→∞ and c→∞.
Proof: Consider the process when indices are randomly
taken from n indices. Let Zi be random number denoting the
number of samples needed to get the ith unique index. Clearly,
P [Z1 = 1] = 1. In general, note that Zi follows the geometric
distribution, i.e.,
P [Zi = j] = (
i− 1
n
)j−1
n− i+ 1
n
.
Let pi = n−i+1n , we have E [Zi] =
1
pi
, and Var [Zi] = 1−pip2i .
Also, {Zi}i are independent of each other. Define Sµ =∑µ
i=1 Zi and note that P [Y ≤ µ] = P [Sµ ≥ c]. Therefore,
we will focus on finding P [Sµ ≥ c].
Define Z ′i = Zi − E [Zi]. Let S′µ =
∑µ
i=1 Z
′
i and note that
P [Sµ ≥ c] = P
[
S′µ ≥ c−
∑µ
i=1
1
pi
]
. As {Z ′i}i are indepen-
dent random variables with zero mean, due to the Central Limit
Theorem, S′µ approximately follows the Gaussian distribution
with zero mean and variance
∑µ
i=1
1−pi
p2i
. Note that as n→∞
and c→∞, µ→∞, therefore,
P
[
S′µ ≥ c−
µ∑
i=1
1
pi
]
= Q(
c−∑µi=1 1pi√∑µ
i=1
1−pi
p2i
),
where Q() is the Gaussian Error Integral. To simplify the
result, note that
µ∑
i=1
1
pi
=
n
n
+
n
n− 1 + ...+
n
n− µ+ 1 ≤ n ln
n
n− µ,
and
µ∑
i=1
1− pi
p2i
=
µ−1∑
i′=0
1− n−i′n
(n−i
′
n )
2
=
µ−1∑
i′=0
ni′
(n− i′)2
= n
µ−1∑
i′=0
[
n
(n− i′)2 −
n− i′
(n− i′)2 ]
< n2
µ−1∑
i′=0
1
(n− i′)2
< n2(
1
n− µ −
1
n
)
Applying these bounds, we have
P [Y ≤ µ] ≤ Q(
c− n ln nn−µ
n
√
( 1n−µ − 1n )
)
The proof completes since Q(x) ≤ e−x
2/2√
2πx
[17].
Note that according to the well-known coupon collector
problem, n[1 − (1 − 1n )c] is actually the average number of
unique indices among c indices, and δ determines how far µ
deviates from this value. This lemma establishes the bound of
the probability that the number of unique indices is less than
1− δ fraction of the average.
Let Y Js denote the random variable of the minimum number
of unique indices in s index sets among all possible choices of
s index sets picked from J index sets. Let µs = n(1− δ)[1−
(1 − 1n )sk] and ηs =
sk−n ln nn−µs
n
√
( 1n−µs−
1
n )
, due to Lemma 3.3, we
have
P
[
Y Js ≤ µs
] ≤ e−η2s/2√
2πηs
Js
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as n → ∞ and sk → ∞. This is because event Y Js ≤ µs
happens if one combination of s index sets have no more than
µs unique indices, which happens with probability as given in
Lemma 3.3, and the total number of combinations to pick s
index sets is less than Js.
Considering practical puzzles, we note that n is very large,
e.g., 107, as well as k, e.g., 104. For any s ≥ 1, as n→∞ and
sk →∞, (1 − 1n )sk approaches e−sk/n. We also pick puzzle
parameters as well as δ, such that P
[
Y Js ≤ µs
]
is negligibly
small for conceivable values of J ; see Section IV for details
which has been confirmed by numerical analysis. Therefore,
we guarantee that for the puzzles we use, the number of unique
indices in any s index sets is no less than (1−δ)n(1−e−sk/n)
with overwhelming probability.
The next lemma is needed in determining the average
number of unique indices in a certain average number of index
sets.
Lemma 3.4: Consider a linear programing problem of maxi-
mizing
∑L
i=0 Pie
−id subject to the constraint that ∑Li=0 Pii =
β,
∑L
i=0 Pi = γ, Pi ≥ 0, where 0 ≤ d, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ β ≤ γL. Denote the optimal value of the objective
function as FL(β, γ), we have
FL(β, γ) = γ − (1− e
−Ld)
L
β
That is, to achieve the optimal value is to let P0 = γ − βL and
PL =
β
L , while let Pi = 0 for 0 < i < L.
Proof: We will induction on L. To begin with, consider
when L = 1. In this case, due to the constraints, P0 and P1 can
be uniquely determined as P0 = γ−β and P1 = β. Therefore,
F1(β, γ) = γ − β + βe−d,
and the lemma is true. Suppose the lemma is true till j. To
get Fj+1(β, γ), suppose Pj+1 = γ − γ′, where γ′ ≤ γ. Given
this, β′ =
∑j
i=0 Pii = β − (γ − γ′)(j + 1), and therefore,
Fj+1(β, γ) = Fj(β
′, γ′) + (γ − γ′)e−(j+1)d
= γ′ − 1− e
−jd
j
β′ + (γ − γ′)e−(j+1)d
= γ′[1− (1− e
−jd)(j + 1)
j
− e−(j+1)d]−
1− e−jd
j
[β − γ(j + 1)] + γe−(j+1)d
Regarding γ′ as a variable, its coefficient is
1− (1− e
−jd)(j + 1)
j
− e−(j+1)d,
which is no more than 0. To see this, consider function
f(x) = 1− (1 − e
−jx)(j + 1)
j
− e−(j+1)x.
Note that f(0) = 0, and f ′(x) < 0 when x ≥ 0. Therefore,
to maximize the objective function, γ′ should be as small as
possible. Note that jPj = β−(j+1)γ+(j+1)γ′ and P0+Pj =
γ′. Therefore,
P0 =
(j + 1)γ − β − γ′
j
.
Since P0 ≤ γ′, we have γ′ ≥ γ− βj+1 . Therefore, Fj+1(β, γ) =
γ − βj+1 + βj+1e−(j+1)d.
Suppose we randomly pick index sets from a total L index
sets when the average number of picked index sets is β. Let
Pi denote the probability that i index sets are picked, where
0 ≤ i ≤ L. We now give the lower bound of the average
number of unique indices in the index sets picked, denoted as
U(β). We have
U(β) ≥
L∑
i=0
(1− δ)n(1− e−ik/n)Pi.
Therefore, to derive the lower bound is to maximize∑L
i=0 Pie
−ik/n subject to the constraints ∑Li=0 Pii = β,∑L
i=0 Pi = 1, Pi ≥ 0.
Based on Lemma 3.4, we immediately have
Lemma 3.5: If the average number of picked index sets is
β, then
U(β) ≥ (1− δ)n(1 − e
−Lk/n)β
L
where δ is a parameter determined by the puzzle parameters.
We may finally assemble the parts together. Suppose A has
an advantage of σ in solving the puzzle when receiving ω(A)
bits on average. Based on Theorem 3.1, BA has an advantage
of no less than σ− qhash2V while receiving no more than ω(A)+
Lkqhash
2V +V bits on average. Based on Theorem 3.2, to achieve
an advantage of at least σ − qhash2V , an algorithm must make at
least (σ−
q
hash
+1
2V
)(L+1)
2 hash queries. Based on Lemma 3.5, also
considering that B needs to receive only k − V + 1 bits per
index set, B receives at least U( (σ−
q
hash
+1
2V
)(L+1)
2 )−L(V − 1)
bits on average. Therefore,
Theorem 3.6: Suppose A solves the puzzle with probability
no less than σ. Let ω(A) denote the average number of
received bits. We have
ω(A) ≥ (1− δ)n(1 − e
−Lk/n)(σ − qhash+12V )(L + 1)
2L
−L(V − 1)− Lkqhash
2V
−V
where qhash, V , and δ are constants determined by the puzzle
parameters.
B. Multiple Adversaries with Multiple Puzzles
We next consider the more complicated case when multiple
adversaries are required to solve multiple puzzles. Suppose
there are A adversaries, and the number of puzzles they attempt
to solve is P . Note that P is greater than A when z > 1.
1) Proof Sketch: The proof uses the same idea as the single
adversary case. Basically, we extend Ω to handle multiple
adversaries, where Ω gives correct answer to a hash query from
an adversary only if the number of bits the adversary received
for the index set is greater than k−V , regardless of the number
of bits other adversaries received. With similar arguments as
the single adversary case, we can establish the relationship
between the algorithm performance when interacting with Ω
and with the real oracles. We also obtain the average number of
informed queries the adversaries must make to achieve certain
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advantages when interacting with Ω. The bound is established
after solving several optimization problems.
2) Proof Details: Suppose the adversaries run an algorithm
A that solves the P puzzles with probability σ while receiving
ω(A) bits on average. We wish to bound from below ω(A) for
a given σ. We extend the definition of Ω and let it remember the
content queries from each adversary. We use Ipℓ to denote index
set ℓ in puzzle p where 1 ≤ p ≤ P . If an adversary makes a
hash query for Ipℓ while this adversary has made content query
for more than k−V bits in Ipℓ , Ω replies with the hash of Ipℓ ,
otherwise, it returns ∅. In addition, if B makes more than L
hash queries for a particular puzzle, Ω will not answer further
hash queries for this puzzle.
Similar to the single puzzle case, given an algorithm A
for solving the puzzles, we construct an algorithm BA em-
ploying A denoted as BA. BA terminates when A terminates,
and returns what A returns. Algorithm 2 describes how BA
implements oracle queries for A which is very similar to the
single adversary case.
Algorithm 2 BA answers oracle queries for A
1: When A makes a query to content, BA makes the same
content query to Ω and gives the result to A.
2: When A makes a query to ans, BA makes the same query
to ans and gives the result to A.
3: When A makes a query for Ipℓ to hash at adversary v:
1) BA checks whether adversary v has made exactly
the same query before. If yes, it returns the same
answer.
2) BA checks whether there are no less than V bits in
Ipℓ that have not been queried for at adversary v, and
if this is true, it returns a random string.
3) BA checks if it has made a hash query for Ipℓ , if no,
it makes a hash query to Ω. If confirm is obtained
upon this query, BA knows Ipℓ is the answer index
set of puzzle p. BA sends content queries Ω to get
the remaining bits in Ipℓ .
4) If Ipℓ is not the answer index set of puzzle p, BA
returns a random string.
5) If the string A submitted is the true string of Ipℓ , BA
returns the hash of Ipℓ .
6) BA returns a random string.
With very similar arguments as in Theorem 3.1, we can have
Theorem 3.7: Let CA be the event that A returns the correct
answers when it is interacting directly with content, hash and
ans. Let CBA be the event that BA returns the correct answers,
when it is interacting with Ω and ans. Then,
P [CBA ] ≥ P [CA]−
Aqhash
2V
,
and
ω[BA] ≤ ω[A] + PLkAqhash
2V
+VP.
Let B denote the optimal algorithm for solving the puzzles
when the algorithm is interacting with Ω. Note that if the
probability that B solves all puzzles is no less than ǫ, the
probability that an individual puzzle is solved is no less than ǫ.
Based on Theorem 3.2, if a puzzle is solved with probability
no less than ǫ, the average number of hash queries made for
this puzzle is no less than (ǫ−
1
2V
)(L+1)
2 . There are P puzzles,
and we obtain the following theorem due to the linearity of
expectation.
Theorem 3.8: If the probability that B solves all puzzles is
no less than ǫ, on average, the number of informed hash queries
is no less than
P (ǫ− 12V )(L + 1)
2
Next, we wish to bound from below the number of unique
indices if the adversaries collectively have to make T informed
hash queries. Here we define the unique indices at adversary v
as the total number of unique indices in the index sets that it
made hash queries for, and denote it as uv. The total number
of unique indices is defined as
∑A
v=1 uv. Recall that Ω will not
answer a hash query from adversary v if adversary v has not
received enough number bits for this index set. Note that Ω will
not answer the hash query even if there exists another adversary
knowing enough bits for this index set. In other words, content
queries made at one adversary do not count as content queries
at other adversaries, which is the one of the key differences
between the single adversary case and the multiple adversary
case. B may be able to assign hash queries to the adversaries
intelligently, such that
∑A
v=1 uv is minimized. For instance, if
two index sets share a large number of indices, they should be
assigned to the same adversary. Nevertheless, we have
Lemma 3.9: If the number of informed queries made by B
is T ,
A∑
v=1
uv ≥ (1− δ)n[t(1 − e−qhashk/n) + (1− e−(T−qhasht)k/n)],
where t =| T/qhash |− and | x |− denotes the largest integer
no more than x.
Proof: An adversary may make no more than qhash
queries. Suppose the number of hash queries made by adver-
sary v is sv. We have
A∑
v=1
uv ≥
A∑
v=1
(1 − δ)n(1− e−svk/n)
Therefore, to minimize
∑A
v=1 uv is to maximize∑A
v=1 e
−svk/n subject to the constraints that ∑Av=1 sv = T
and 0 ≤ sv ≤ qhash.
We claim that the optimal is achieved when si is set to be
qhash for 1 ≤ i ≤| T/qhash |−, which we show by induction
on the number of adversaries. First consider when A = 2. If
T ≤ qhash, we claim that
∑2
i=1 e
−sik/n is maximized when
s1 = T and s2 = 0, which is because for any valid s1 and s2,
(1 + e−Tk/n)− (e−s1k/n + e−s2k/n)
= (1− e−s1k/n)(1− e−s2k/n)
≥ 0.
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Similarly, if qhash ≤ T ≤ 2qhash,
∑A
i=1 e
−sik/n is maximized
when s1 = qhash and s2 = T − qhash, which is because for any
valid s1 and s2,
(e−qhashk/n + e−(T−qhash)k/n)− (e−s1k/n + e−s2k/n)
= (1− e(−s1+T−qhash)k/n)(e(−T+qhash)k/n − e−s2k/n)
≥ 0.
Therefore our claim is true for A = 2. Suppose our claim
is true for A = j. For A = j + 1, suppose in the optimal
assignment, sj+1 = 0. Then, our claim is true based on the
induction hypothesis. If in the optimal assignment, sj+1 > 0,
we prove that in the optimal assignment si = qhash for all
1 ≤ i ≤ j, therefore our claim is still true. This because if
si < qhash for some i, we can increase si while decreasing
sj+1. Using similar arguments as for case when A = 2, this
will increase the objective function, thus violating the fact that
the assignment is optimal.
Similar to the single adversary case, if the average number
of informed hash queries B makes is β, we need to bound from
below the average number of unique indices in the involved
index sets, denoted as U(β).
Lemma 3.10: Consider there are A adversaries given P
puzzles, if the average number of informed hash queries is
β,
U(β) ≥ (1− δ)nβ(1 − e
−qhashk/n)
qhash
Proof: Denote the probability that there are i queries as
Pi, where 0 ≤ i ≤ PL. For notational simplicity, in this proof,
we let d = k/n. Based on Lemma 3.9, we want to bound from
below
PL∑
i=0
Pi[(ti − 1)(1− e−qhashd) + (1− e−[i−qhash(ti−1)]d)]
under the constraints that
PL∑
i=0
Pii = β,
PL∑
i=0
Pi = 1,
Pi ≥ 0,
where ti is an integer such that (ti − 1)qhash ≤ i < tiqhash. To
solve this problem, suppose C is the minimum integer satis-
fying PL ≤ Cqhash − 1, we relax the problem to minimizing
Ψ =
Cqhash−1∑
i=0
Pi[(ti− 1)(1− e−qhashd)+ (1− e−[i−qhash(ti−1)]d)]
under the same constraints that
Cqhash−1∑
i=0
Pii = β,
Cqhash−1∑
i=0
Pi = 1,
Pi ≥ 0.
The optimal of relaxed problem will be no more than the
optimal of the original problem. To solve the relaxed problem,
let
Ψs =
sqhash−1∑
i=(s−1)qhash
Pi[(s−1)(1−e−qhashd)+(1−e−[i−qhash(s−1)]d)]
for 1 ≤ s ≤ C. Clearly, Ψ =∑Cs=1 Ψs.
Suppose a set of {γs}s and {βs}s are given where∑C
s=1 γs = 1 and
∑C
s=1 βs = β. The set of {γs}s and {βs}s
are called feasible if it is possible to find {Pi}i such that
sqhash−1∑
i=(s−1)qhash
Pi = γs,
and
sqhash−1∑
i=(s−1)qhash
Pii = βs
for all 1 ≤ s ≤ C. Note that {γs}s and {βs}s are feasible if
and only if
(s− 1)qhashγs ≤ βs ≤ (sqhash − 1)γs.
When {γs}s and {βs}s are given and are feasible, to
minimize Ψ is to minimize each individual Ψs. Note that
Ψs = γs[(s− 1)(1− e−qhashd) + 1]
−
sqhash−1∑
i=(s−1)qhash
Pie
−[i−qhash(s−1)]d
= γs[(s− 1)(1− e−qhashd) + 1]
−
qhash−1∑
h=0
Pqhash(s−1)+he
−hd,
where h = i− qhash(s− 1). Note that if
sqhash−1∑
i=(s−1)qhash
Pii = βs,
then
qhash−1∑
h=0
Pqhash(s−1)+hh = βs − (s− 1)qhashγs.
Denote the minimum value of Ψs for given γs and βs as
Ψγs,βss . Applying Lemma 3.4,
Ψγs,βss = γs[(s− 1)(1− e−qhashd) + 1]− γs
+[
1− e−(qhash−1)d
qhash − 1 ][βs − (s− 1)qhashγs]
= γs(s− 1)[qhashe
−(qhash−1)d
qhash − 1 − e
−qhashd
− 1
qhash − 1 ] + [
1− e−(qhash−1)d
qhash − 1 ]βs
Let
a =
qhashe
−(qhash−1)d
qhash − 1 − e
−qhashd − 1
qhash − 1
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and
b =
1− e−(qhash−1)d
qhash − 1 ,
we have
Ψ ≥
C∑
s=1
Ψγs,βss = bβ + a
C∑
s=1
(s− 1)γs.
We also note that a < 0, which is because function
f(x) =
qhashe
−(qhash−1)x
qhash − 1 − e
−qhashx − 1
qhash − 1
is 0 when x = 0, while f ′(x) < 0 for x > 0. Therefore,
finding the minimum value of Ψ is equivalent to finding a
set of feasible {γs}s and {βs}s such that
∑C
s=1(s − 1)γs is
maximized.
We consider the problem of maximizing
W =
C∑
s=1
(s− 1)γs
subject to the constraints that
(s− 1)qhashγs ≤ βs ≤ (sqhash − 1)γs,
C∑
s=1
γs = γ,
C∑
s=1
βs = β,
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ β ≤ γ(Cqhash − 1). Denote the
maximum value of W as W ∗. We claim that
• If (C − 1)qhashγ < β, W ∗ = γ(C − 1) and the optimal
is achieved when γC = γ, βC = β, while γs = 0 and
βs = 0 for 1 ≤ s < C;
• If (C − 1)qhashγ ≥ β, W ∗ = βqhash , and the optimal value
is achieved when γ1 = γ − β(C−1)qhash , β1 = 0, γC =
β
(C−1)qhash , βC = β, while γs = 0 and βs = 0 for 1 <
s < C.
To show this, we use induction on C. First, when C = 2,
W = γ2. Note that
• If qhashγ < β, we can let γ2 = γ, β2 = β, while γ1 = 0
and β1 = 0, in which case γ2 is maximized, while all
constraints are satisfied;
• If qhashγ ≥ β, note that for any given β2, γ2 ≤ β2qhash ≤
β
qhash
. When β ≤ qhashγ, we may let γ1 = γ− βqhash , β1 = 0,
γ2 =
β
qhash
, β2 = β, such that all constraints are satisfied,
while γ2 is maximized.
Therefore, our claim is true when C = 2. Suppose the claim
is true till C = j. When C = j + 1,
• If jqhashγ < β, we may let γj+1 = γ, βj+1 = β, and let
γs = 0 and βs = 0 for 1 ≤ s ≤ j, such that all constraints
are satisfied. In this case, W = jγ. Since W ≤ jγ, we
have W ∗ = jγ.
• If jqhashγ ≥ β, suppose some 0 ≤ γ′ ≤ γ, 0 ≤ β′ ≤ β
are given that also satisfy
(γ − γ′)jqhash ≤ (β − β′) ≤ (γ − γ′)[(j + 1)qhash − 1]
and
β′ ≤ γ′(jqhash − 1).
We can let
∑j
s=1 γs = γ
′ and
∑j
s=1 βs = β
′
.
– If (j − 1)qhashγ′ < β′, based on the induction
hypothesis, the maximum value of
∑j
s=1(s − 1)γs
is (j − 1)γ′, and hence
W ≤ jγ − γ′.
Because
(γ − γ′)jqhash ≤ (β − β′),
we have
γ′ ≥ γ − β
jqhash
+
β′
jqhash
.
As (j − 1)qhashγ′ < β′, we have
γj − β
qhash
< γ′.
Therefore,
W ≤ β
qhash
.
– If (j − 1)qhashγ′ ≥ β′, based on the induction
hypothesis, the maximum value of
∑j
s=1(s − 1)γs
is β
′
qhash
, and hence
W ≤ β
′
qhash
+ (γ − γ′)j.
Since (γ − γ′)j ≤ β−β′qhash , we have
W ≤ β
qhash
.
Note that W achieves βqhash when γ1 = γ−
β
jqhash
, β1 = 0,
γj+1 =
β
jqhash
, βj+1 = β, while γs = 0 and βs = 0 for
1 < s ≤ j. Therefore, W ∗ = βqhash .
Note that actually, in the first case when jqhashγ < β, jγ ≤
β
qhash
, therefore we also have W ∗ ≤ βqhash . Hence,
Ψ ≥ bβ + a β
qhash
=
β(1 − e−qhashd)
qhash
,
which completes our proof.
Similar to single puzzle case, we may now put things to-
gether. Suppose A has an advantage of σ in solving the puzzles
when receiving ω(A) bits on average. Based on Theorem
3.7, BA has an advantage of no less than σ − Aqhash2V while
receiving no more than ω(A)+PLkAqhash2V +VP bits on average.
Based on Theorem 3.8, to achieve an advantage of at least
σ− Aqhash2V , any algorithm must make at least
P (σ− qhash+1
2V
)(L+1)
2
hash queries. Based on Lemma 3.10, also considering that B
needs to receive only k−V +1 bits per index set, B receives
at least U(P (σ−
q
hash
+1
2V
)(L+1)
2 ) − PL(V − 1) bits on average.
Therefore,
Theorem 3.11: Suppose A adversaries are challenged with
P puzzles. Suppose A solves the puzzle with probability no
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less than σ and let ω(A) denote the average number of received
bits. We have
ω(A) ≥ (1− δ)nP (σ −
qhash+1
2V )(L + 1)(1− e−qhashk/n)
2qhash
−PL(V − 1)− PLkAqhash
2V
−VP
where qhash, V , and δ are constants determined by the puzzle
parameters.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
In this section we discuss the bound and its practical
implications. We begin by considering a simple strategy the
adversaries may adopt to be compared with the bound.
A. A Simple Adversary Strategy
We note that there exists a simple strategy the adversaries
may adopt to be compared with the bound. In this strategy,
when challenged with the puzzles, the adversaries flip a coin
and decide whether to attempt to solve the puzzles. They
attempt with probability σ; otherwise they simply ignore the
puzzles. If they decide to solve the puzzles, the adversities
select P (L+1)2qhash members, and let each of them get the entire
content. Each of the chosen adversaries makes qhash hash
queries allowed for them. For each puzzle, the adversaries
make hash queries for the index sets one by one until a confirm
is obtained.
We now analyze the performance of this strategy. We argue
that the adversaries can solve the puzzles with probability
close to 1 if they decide to attempt, hence their advantage
is σ. Note that to get a confirm for puzzle according to
this strategy, the number of hash queries follows a uniform
distribution in [1, L] and is independent of other puzzles. The
total number of hash queries is a random variable with mean
P (L+1)
2 . As the number of puzzles increases, the distribution
of this variable approaches a Gaussian distribution centered
around the mean with decreasing variance. Therefore, if the
adversaries can make P (L+1)2 hash queries, the probability
that they can solve the puzzles asymptotically approaches 1.
Note that this is possible because there are P (L+1)2qhash selected
adversaries, each making qhash queries. According this strategy,
the average number of bits downloaded is σnP (L+1)2qhash .
B. Puzzle Parameter Space
As can be observed in Theorem 3.11, the dominating factor
in the number of bits is roughly σnP (L+1)2qhash , if the following
conditions are satisfied:
1) δ is small comparing to 1,
2) e−qhashk/n is small comparing to 1,
3) 2V is much larger than Aqhash,
4) 2V is no less than kAqhash,
5) V is much smaller than k.
If these conditions are satisfied, the bound approaches the
actual number of bits downloaded by the simple adversary
strategy above, therefore is tight.
We show that there are a wide range of values of L, k, z, n
and qhash satisfying these conditions, for which the bound can
be applied to provide security guarantees. Note that P = Az.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of the average number of bits downloaded by the simple
strategy and the bound when σ = 1, k = 104, qhash = 4n/k and Lz =
qhash/2. (a). n = 107. (b). n = 108.
In the following we use an example to illustrate the choice of
parameters when A ≤ 106; the parameters can be similarly
determined for other values of A. Concerning the conditions,
• For Condition 1, we note that δ should be as small as
possible, provided that the probability that the number
of unique indices in any s index sets is less than (1 −
δ)n(1− e−sk/n) is negligibly small. We find numerically
that when A ≤ 106, for k ≥ 104, zL ≤ 106, n ≥ 107, if
δ = 0.1, this probability for any s is below 10−12.
• Condition 2 can be considered as satisfied when qhashk ≥
4n, noting that e−4 = 0.018.
• When A ≤ 106, V can be set to be 60. Condition 3
is satisfied when qhash ≤ 106. Condition 4 is satisfied if
k ≤ 106. Condition 5 is satisfied if k ≥ 104.
The above discussions give the range of the puzzle parame-
ters. Basically, if we let δ = 0.1 and V = 60, we only require
n ≥ 107, 106 ≥ k ≥ 104, 106 ≥ Lz, qhashk ≥ 4n, 106 ≥ qhash,
when A ≤ 106.
Note that k should be set to its lower bound 104, because
a larger value of k results in a heavier load of the verifier.
qhash should be no less than Lz to ensure an honest prover
can solve the puzzles. Figure 1 shows the average number of
bits needed by the simple strategy and the lower bound as
a function of the number of adversaries for different content
sizes, when σ = 1, qhash = 4n/k and Lz = qhash/2. We
can see that they differ only by a small constant factor. We
have tested other parameters satisfying the constraints and the
results show similar trends.
C. Puzzle Parameters in Practice
We also note that the parameter space is not restrictive
in practice. Considering the speed of modern communication
networks, a reasonable rate to challenge the prover should be
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machine CPU SHA1 AES
pc3000 3.0GHz 64-bit 202165 4059157
pc2000 2.0GHz 71016 2605490
pc850 850MHz 39151 1086667
pc600 600MHz 29064 789624
TABLE 3
SHA-1 AND AES FUNCTION CALLS EXECUTED IN ONE SECOND.
once at least every 1MB of data, i.e., when n is at least around
107. There is also no obstacle to set k to be 104 . Concerning θ
which determines qhash, note that the puzzles should be solved
in a reasonable amount of time to reduce the load of the prover,
but the time should also be non-trivial to account for random
fluctuations of network latency. Therefore a reasonable value
of θ should be in the order of several seconds. Given these
choices of n, k, and θ, z and L should satisfy three conditions,
according to our earlier discussions: (1) kL ≤ 106, (2) kLz
should be no less than, for example, 2n, and (3) the time to
make kL hash queries should be several seconds but no more
than θ.
Note that there are two time consuming tasks when making
hash queries, which are the hash function call and the gen-
eration of the random indices. The choices of hash function
and random number generator have been discussed in [14].
Basically, secure hash functions such as SHA-1 can be used
as the hash function and block ciphers such as AES can be
used to generate the random indices. The optimization of the
puzzle implementation is out of the scope of this paper due to
the limit of space. We here show the speed of several machines
in Emulab [1] when executing the SHA-1 hash and the AES
encryption in the Openssl library [2], summarized in Table 3,
when the input to SHA-1 is 104 bits and the AES is 128 bits.
If n = 107, k = 104 and θ = 3sec, the results indicate that on
modern mainstream machines such as pc3000 and pc2000, (1)
it is not possible to make more than 106 hash queries within
θ, (2) it is possible to make enough number of hash queries
within θ such that kLz ≥ 2n after optimizations in random
index generation, and (3) when kLz ≥ 2n, solving the puzzles
will take time in the order of seconds.
V. RELATED WORK
Using puzzles has been proposed (e.g., in [10], [12], [3],
[9], [8]) to defend against email spamming or denial of service
attacks. In these schemes, the clients are required to spend
time to solve puzzles before getting access to the service.
The purpose of the bandwidth puzzle is to verify whether
the claimed content transactions took place, where the ability
to solve the puzzles is tied to the amount contents actually
downloaded. As such, the construction of the bandwidth puzzle
is different from existing puzzles.
Proofs of data possession (PDP) (e.g., [4], [11], [5]) and
Proofs of retrievability (POR) (e.g., [13], [7], [15]) have been
proposed to allow a client to verify whether the data has
been modified in a remote store. As discussed in [14], the
key differences between PDP/POR schemes and the bandwidth
puzzle include the following. First, PDP/POR assumes a single
verifier and prover, while the bandwidth puzzle considers one
verifier with many potentially colluding provers. Second, the
bandwidth puzzle has low computational cost at the verifier,
which is desirable in the case when one verifier has to handle
many provers, while the existing PDP/POR schemes may incur
heavy computational cost at the verifier. The proof techniques
for PDP/POR schemes are also different from the techniques
used in this paper, because collusion is not considered in
existing PDP/POR schemes.
The bandwidth puzzle was first proposed in [14] along with
a detailed performance evaluation based on an implemented
p2p streaming system and a larger simulated p2p network.
The results show that the bandwidth puzzle can effectively
improve the performance of the honest users in the presence
of colluding adversaries. A bound was also given in [14] on
the expected number of puzzles solved when the adversaries
can make no more than a certain number of hash queries
and download no more than a certain number of content
bits. The purpose of this work is to derive a bound on the
average number of bits downloaded, when the adversaries can
make no more than a certain number of hash queries but can
download as many content bits as they wish. Therefore the
problem studied in this work is different from that in [14].
Our analysis show that the new bound is asymptotically tight
for all numbers of adversaries, while the bound given in [14]
deteriorates quickly as the number of adversaries increases,
and the largest number of adversaries used in [14] is 50 when
evaluating the bound. As discussed earlier, it is not difficult to
find puzzle parameters satisfying the requirements of the new
bound. The bound given in [14] requires much more restrictive
choices of parameters. For instance, the suggested values of k
and L are 14n
3/10 and 112n
71/100
, respectively (it was assumed
that z = 1 in [14]). A consequence is that the limit on number
of bits downloaded by the adversaries must be significantly
smaller than n for the bound to give satisfactory results.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proved a new bound on the performance
of the bandwidth puzzle which has been proposed to de-
fend against colluding adversaries in p2p content distribution
networks. Our proof is based on reduction, and gives the
lower bound of the average number of downloaded bits to
achieve a certain advantage by the adversaries. The bound is
asymptotically tight in the sense that it is a small fraction
away from the average number of bits downloaded when
following a simple strategy. The new bound is a significant
improvement over the existing bound which was derived under
more restrictive conditions and much looser. The improved
bound can be used to guide the choice of puzzle parameters
to improve the performance of practical systems.
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